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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE
CONTROL OF RADIOACTIVE POLLUTION
An inherent objective of any program of atomic energy production is that
the energy be developed with proper regard for environmental standards.
While there can be no reasonable dispute with the stated objective, differ-
ences have frequently arisen over where the responsibility for safeguarding
against radiation hazards should lie. State governments have expressed a
strong desire to regulate the environmental aspects of atomic energy produc-
tion,' but have, as yet, been prevented from assuming any role.
Without question, it is within the power of the Congress to preclude the
states from exercising any control over atomic waste disposal,' though the
power has never been expressly invoked. Until quite recently the posture of
the law has been that the states are pre-empted from acting in this area by the
implication of congressional intent' contained in the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 and the amendments thereto.' Doubt as to the validity of this conclusion
has been created, however, by the 1972 amendments to the Water Pollution
Control Act' and a recent interpretation of this legislation by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 6 By examining the applicable federal legislation and
the judicial construction it has received, this note will consider whether the
opportunity now exists for the states to assume a more vital role in the
regulation of radioactive pollution.
THE PREVAILING DOCTRINE OF FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION
The federal legislation as regards nuclear energy production has changed
dramatically within the relatively short period ,of time during which it has been
a subject of national concern. The original Atomic Energy Act established a
governmental monopoly by placing the ownership of all production facilities in
the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). 7 In 1954, private ownership was
1. See Note, 46 TUL. L. REv. 1016, 1020 (1972).
2. See Estep and Adelman, State Control of Radiation Hazards: An Intergovernmental
Problem, 60 MICH. L. REv. 41 (1961), for an analysis of the constitutional bases for
congressional authority in this area.
3. See Northern States Power Co. v. State of Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971),
affid, 405 U. S. 1035 (1972).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1970).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et. seq. (Supp. 1973). (Hereinafter referred to as 1972
amendments).
6. Colorado Public Interest Research Group Inc. v. Train, 507 F.2d 743 (10th Cir.
1974).
7. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Act. of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 1073, 60 Stat. 755. [By the
provisions of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, § 201 (f), 88 Stat.
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permitted, though subject to strict regulation.$ And in 1959, the Act was
amended to provide for a limited degree of state participation in the regulation
of the atomic energy industry.9
It was in light of this background that Northern States Power Co. v. State
of Minnesota was decided. 10 Minnesota had enacted radioactive waste
disposal regulations which set higher standards than the comparable AEC
radiation safety requirements. The power company challenged the state's
authority to enforce these regulations on the ground that exclusive jurisdiction
had been vested in the AEC." The court held that under the doctrine of
implied pre-emption the federal government has the sole authority to regulate
nuclear power plants, including the regulation of radioactive effluents dis-
charged from such facilities.
At the outset, it was noted that Congress had never expressly precluded
state regulation, and since no physical impossibility of dual compliance was
presented, the sole issue was whether Congress had implied an intent to
displace all concomitant state regulation. The necessary intent was found to
be implied by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and its legislative
history, as well as by the inherent nature of the subject matter being
regulated.12
The primary statutory provision involved in Northern States was section
2021 of the 1959 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act. 3 That section of
the Act has the expressed purpose of clarifying the responsibilities of the
states and the AEC, and authorizes the AEC to enter into agreements with a
state for the transfer of AEC regulatory jurisdiction in certain areas. The
same provision prohibits the AEC from discontinuing its authority with
respect to certain activities including "the construction and operation of any
production and utilization facility".14 The state argued that this language only
prohibited the total relinquishment of federal supervisory authority, and not
concurrent regulation by both the AEC and a state."5
The majority, however, felt that the statutory language implied that
federal legislation was to be exclusive, absent the execution of a compact with
the state. This result was considered to be mandated by the history of atomic
1233 (Oct. 11, 1974), the licensing and regulatory functions of the AEC have been transferred
to the newly-formed Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In regard to the subject matter of this note
the change is in name only, as the statutes discussed remain unchanged and in force.)
8. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2061 (1970).
9. Id. § 2021.
10. 447F.2d 1143 (8thCir. 1971),qff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
11. Id. at 1144.
12. Id. at 1153.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1970).
14. Id. § 2021 (c) (1).
15. The same argument was advanced in In Re Dresden Nuclear Power Station, 2 ERC
1302 (1971), where the Illinois Pollution Control Board held that it had the jurisdiction to
regulate nuclear waste disposals, despite the holding of the district court in Northern States.
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energy regulation"6 and by a reading of the statutory provisions as a whole. In
the latter regard it was stated:
Finally, we are of the firm opinion that the mere enactment of
elaborate and detailed legislation authorizing turnover agreements to
effect a cession to the states of regulatory authority over some
activities associated with radiation hazards, and specifically prohibit-
ing the relinquishment of authority over others, in itself evinces an
inescapable implication that the federal government possessed exclu-
sive authority absent the agreements authorized by the 1959
amendments. 11
The foregoing interpretation of section 2021 is essential to the Northern
States decision, and is the strongest foundation for the majority's holding. The
legislative history of the amendment was also relied upon,'" though portions of
the legislative background would seem to be more consistent with the
interpretation argued by the state.19 The court also determined that the nature
of atomic energy production required uniform regulation at the federal level in
order to prevent overprotective state health laws from hindering the industrial
development of atomic energy as a power source.2 0
A dissent was filed in Northern States which disputed each of the
conclusions relied upon in the majority opinion. The dissent noted the lack of
express pre-emption, and did not find that the Act, as a whole, clearly implied
that AEC jurisdiction was to be exclusive.2' Nor was the failure to exclude
state participation in unmistakable terms considered a mere oversight in light
of the legislative history.12
The dissenting opinion in Northern States demonstrated a reluctance to
overturn the state regulations in question. In general, the courts have been
disinclined to find state laws concerning public health and safety pre-empted
by federal regulation absent a clear and unmistakable manifestation of
Congressional intent.23 An illustration is Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City
of Detroit,14 in which the Supreme Court held that the city could enforce an
anti-smoke pollution ordinance against a shipowner whose equipment had
been inspected and licensed under extensive federal regulations. 5 The Court
refused to hold the city ordinance pre-empted though the vessel was engaged
16. 447 F.2dat 1150.
17. Id.
18. The Northern States court relied primarily upon the Senate Report; see S. Rep. No.
870, 86d Cong., Ist Sess. (1959).
19. See the testimony of Mr. Lowenstein of the Office of the General Counsel, AEC,
reported in Note, 68 MicH. L. REV. 1294 (1970), and set forth at 447 F.2d at 1155-56.
20. 447 F.2dat 1154.
21. Id. at 1156.
22. In this regard, it should be noted that the Office of the General Counsel, AEC,
specifically declined to request an express pre-emption provision when questioned before the
Joint Committee. See sources cited supra note 19.
23. See, e.g., Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940).
24. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
25. Id. at 441-42.
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in interstate commerce, and despite the fact that the ordinance imposed
criminal sanctions on the shipowner who had fully complied with all applicable
federal regulations. 6
The Huron decision clearly indicates an unwillingness to interfere with
state health measures which is lacking in Northern States. And the dissent
demonstrates that the statutory language and legislative history of section
2021 is susceptible to varying interpretations. Nonetheless, Northern States
has remained an effective bar to state assertions of authority to regulate
radioactive pollution in the face of the Atomic Energy Act.2" For this
authority, the states must look to subsequent legislation.
THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972
In 1972, Congress amended the Water Pollution Control Act to include
provisions which, on their face, appear to express the intent necessary to
abrogate the Northern States doctrine. Under the Act, the administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] is charged with the responsibility of
regulating pollution in navigable waters.2" Section 1362 defines pollutant to
include "radioactive materials," and a separate provision allows the states to
impose stricter performance standards than those set by the EPA. 9 The
literal terms of the statutes thus suggest a departure from the holding of
Northern States, since the EPA, rather than the AEC, is made responsible for
the control of "radioactive materials," and the states are authorized to
regulate more stringently than the EPA.
26. Id. at 449 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
27. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Pollution Control Board, 5 IlI.App.3d 800, 284
N.E.2d 342 (1972), where the court relied upon Northern States to reverse the decision of In re
Dresden, 2 ERC 1302 (1971).
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. 1973).
29. 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (6) (Supp. 1973), provides:
The term "pollutant" means dredged soil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage,
garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive
materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial,
municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water. This term does not mean (A)
"sewage from vessels" within the meaning of section 1322 of this title; or (B) water,
gas, or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate production of oil or gas, or
water derived in association with oil or gas production and disposed of in a well, if the
well used either to facilitate production or for disposal purposes is approved by authority
of the State in which the well is located and if such State determines that such injection
or disposal will not result in the degradation of ground or surface water resources.
And 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Supp. 1973), provides:
Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall (1) preclude
or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof or interstate agency to
adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants, or
(B) any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution; except that if an
effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment
standard, or standard of performance is in effect under this chapter, such State or
political subdivision or interstate agency may not adopt or enforce any effluent
limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or
standard of performance which is less stringent than the effluent limitation, or other
limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of perform-
ance under this chapter; or (2) be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any
right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the water (including boundary water) of
such States.
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In 1973, however, the administrator issued regulations which severely
limited the scope of the phrase radioactive materials on the ground that
Congress did not intend the words to carry a broad meaning. The regulation
states that the only radioactive wastes encompassed by the definition of
pollutant are those which were not being regulated by the AEC prior to the
time the amendments were enacted. 0 Thus, source, by-product and special
nuclear materials, which constitute the vast majority of the waste materials
created by power plants, are not included in the EPA definition.3 The EPA
position would therefore be that the 1972 amendments have no effect upon
the established doctrine of Northern States and that the states remain pre-
empted.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 1972 AMENDMENTS
In Colorado Public Interest Research Group Inc. v. Train,3" the validity
of the EPA interpretation was directly challenged. A citizen suit was brought
against the EPA administrator seeking to compel that agency to exercise
control over discharges of radioactive materials into navigable waters.33 Two
atomic plants were involved, one of which was owned by the AEC. Both
facilities had applied to the EPA for discharge permits, but in each case the
administrator denied that he had the authority to regulate their operations.
The sole issue presented was whether the Water Pollution Control Act
amendments conferred jurisdiction upon the EPA. The district court held for
the defendant and accepted the interpretation of the 1972 amendments
contained in the regulation issued by the EPA. The legislative history was
found to support the contention that Congress had never intended to displace
AEC jurisdiction, and it was noted that dual regulation of atomic energy
producers would lead to undesirable results.3 4
Perhaps it is possible for both the EPA and the AEC to regulate
wastes of 'source', 'by-product' and 'special' nuclear materials, but
for both to try to do so would be likely to create not only wasted
effort, but, worse, confusion, and possible danger to the public. 3
30. 40 C.F.R. § 125.1 (x) (1973), provides in pertinent part:
COMMENT.-The legislative history of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 reflects that the term 'radioactive materials' as included within the
definition of 'pollutant' in section 502 of the Act covers only radioactive materials which
are not encompassed in the definition of source, by-product, or special nuclear materials
as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and regulated pursuant to
the latter Act. Examples of radioactive materials not covered by the Atomic Energy
Act, and therefore, included within the term 'pollutant' are radium and accelerator
produced isotopes.
31. See text of regulation supra note 30 for the limited type of radiation pollutants included
in the EPA interpretation of section 1362 (6).
32. 507 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1974).
33. Citizen suits to enforce the provisions of the Water Pollution Control Act are
authorized by 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (a) (2) (Supp. 1973).
34. 373 F. Supp. 991, 994-96 (D. Colo. 1974).
35. Id. at 994.
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Additionally, the energy crisis was mentioned as a persuasive, though non-
controlling, factor in the decision."
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court, and
held that the 1972 amendments charged the EPA and its administrator with
the duty of regulating the discharge of all radioactive waste materials into
navigable waters." In effect, the court held that the 1972 amendments mean
exactly what they say. In reaching the decision, reliance was placed upon
several basic rules of statutory construction. These rules included that "an
unambiguous statute must be given effect according to its plain and obvious
meaning;" and that when "the legislature has excepted certain categories from
the operation of a particular law . . . additional exceptions are not war-
ranted."3 The latter rule is relevant to an interpretation of section 1362 (6),
since the statute does except certain materials from its coverage without
mentioning the exception embodied in the EPA regulation.39 A final rule
which was cited is that the legislative history of an enactment cannot be used
to alter its clear and plain meaning.4
Under these rules of construction the statute was found to be plain,
unambiguous, and entitled to be given its obvious meaning. As the court
stated in discussing the statutory language:
The statute does not say 'some' radioactive materials, or radioactive
materials 'except for', just radioactive materials. So it would seem to
us that if we give the words thus used in the statute their plain and
obvious meaning, the EPA Administrator is charged with the duty
of regulating the discharge of radioactive materials into navigable
waters. No exceptions having been set forth in the statute as
concerns radioactive material, it would follow that the term 'radioac-
tive materials' means all radioactive materials, and we so hold.4
Since the statute was found to be unambiguous, the legislative history of the
act was not considered, as it would be immaterial under the rule of
construction previously noted.4 2
A similar interpretation of the 1972 amendments is found in Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. Callaway,43 which, though not concerned
with radioactive pollution regulation, did involve analogous questions of
statutory construction. In Scenic Hudson the argument that the 1972
36. Id. at 995.
37. 507 F.2d at 749.
38. Id. at 746-47.
39. See text of statute supra note 29.
40. 507 F.2d at 747. For this rule of construction the court cited United States v. Oregon,
366 U.S. 643 (1961), and Ex Parte Collett, 377 U.S. 55 (1949). Both authorities support the
proposition that the plain meaning of a statute may not be overcome by the legislative history, but
it should be noted that in each case the Court went on to state that its decision was in line with
the intent manifested by the legislative history.
41. 507 F.2dat 747.
42. See supra note 40.
43. 370 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
amendments were not intended to displace certain licensing powers of the
Federal Power Commission was rejected. Section 1344 of the Water
Pollution Control Act 4 requires that a permit to discharge dredged or fill
material is to be obtained from the Secretary of the Army rather than the
EPA administrator. The court held that this section applied to an electric
power company, and that no exception could be inferred from the fact that
this would be an interference with the long-established jurisdiction of the
Federal Power Commission .4 As in Colorado Public Interest Group, the
terms of the statute were given a literal meaning.
An analysis of the statutory language interpreted in Colorado Public
Interest Group supports the decision of the circuit court. The provisions in
question are, in fact, clear and unambiguous. If Congress had intended to
create a major exception in the class of pollutants which radioactive materials
represent, it is reasonable to assume that the exception would have been
expressed. This assumption is also justified by the fact that the statute in
question does clearly list certain materials which are exempt from its
coverage. As the opinion noted, "[hiere, the statute declares not only what
the term pollutant 'means', but what it 'does not mean'."'4 6 To accept the
definition put forth by the EPA, the court would have had to step beyond the
boundaries of interpretation and engage in a rewriting of the statute involved.
The strength of the decision is that these limits were not crossed.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The legislative history of the 1972 amendments is, in part, inconsistent
with the clear language of the statutes finally enacted. As previously noted,
Colorado Public Interest Group did not consider the legislative history of the
act, since such a consideration was foreclosed by the principles of statutory
construction which were held to be controlling. 41 It was parenthetically noted,
however, that the legislative history was conflicting and inconclusive." The
district court also found some support for the plaintiff's position in the
legislative record, but concluded that the history overwhelmingly favored the
defendant's interpretation.' 9 On the whole, the report of the House Commit-
tee and the floor debate demonstrate that the committee members did not
believe that section 1362 (6) would interfere with AEC regulatory authority
over atomic waste disposal.5 0 Similar evidence can be found in the records of
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. 1973).
45. 370 F. Supp. at 170.
46. 507 F.2d at 747.
47. See text preceding note 42 supra.
48. 507 F.2d at 748.
49. 373 F. Supp. at 994.
50. See H.R. Rep. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), and 117 Cong. Rec. 17,401
(daily ed. Nov. 2, 1971). See also 118 Cong. Rec. 10,666 (1972) (remarks of Mr. Harsha, a
manager of the bill, in response to an inquiry concerning the meaning of "radioactive materials"):
As I said earlier in the debate on the Wolf amendment, we intended to leave the
jurisdiction of radioactive material that came within the Atomic Energy Act up to the
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the Senate proceedings."'
While the above portions of the legislative history lend some support to
the EPA contentions, which were rejected in Colorado Public Interest Group,
they are not compelling when contrasted with the clear language of section
1362 (6). The legislative background is more damaging, however, to the
validity of the proposition that the states are now free to regulate radioactive
water pollution.
In the House debate, which preceded the enactment of the 1972
amendments, an amendment was proposed which would have directly abol-
ished the Northern States doctrine. After discussion, during which Northern
States was mentioned, the amendment to the bill was rejected. 2 If a state is to
contend that the 1972 amendments are a grant of authority over a previously
foreclosed subject, it will surely be met with this expression of adverse
congressional intent, and must be prepared to confront it.
ANALYSIS
The effect which Colorado Public Interest Group will have upon the
regulation of the atomic energy industry is as yet unclear. It has, however,
undeniably opened an avenue for the reassertion of state's rights in the field.
Though the holding of the court was specifically limited to the question of
jurisdiction between the EPA and the AEC, the implications of the decision
are far reaching. Northern States was cited by the EPA in Colorado Public
Interest Group, and was relied upon in the district opinion which was
Atomic Energy Commission. The language applied only to everything outside thejurisdiction of AEC. That is definitely the intent of the wording of the bill and the intent
of the committee.
But see 118 Cong. Rec. 10,802 (1972) (remarks of Mr. Frenzel in response to the above
statement and the discussion preceding it):
The intent of the discussion was to establish that H.R. 11896 did not apply to pollution,
radioactive or thermal, from nuclear power plants controlled or regulated by the Atomic
Energy Commission. A discussion on the floor of this House may or may not be helpful
in determining lesiglative intent. More often than not it simply determines the intent or
purposes of the few people engaging in that particular discussion. In the case of H.R.
11896, the bill clearly applies to various kinds of pollutants which the gentlemen
referred to above are trying to cut out of the bill by their discussions yesterday . . . No
matter what kinds of discussions may take place on the floor of this House, it seems to
me quite obvious in the legislation itself that it was the clear intent to include all kinds of
pollution except the four specified exemptions . . . No matter what some of our
Members would like to be the intent of the bill, the bill is quite obvious and needs no
amplification. As long as the bill has stipulated what is to be exempted and what is to be
controlled, nothing that is said on the floor of the House can change the language of this
bill.
51. 117 Cong. Rec. 38,802-03 (1971) (remarks of Senators Muskie and Pastore
concerning the Northern States decision then on appeal to the United States Supreme Court):
Mr. Pastore. Yes. As a matter of fact, that decision held that the Federal Government
did preempt in this field under existing law. That is the opinion, and we hope this
legislation does not change that opinion in any way, and does not affect existing law.
That is all I am concerned with.
Mr. Muskie. The Senator is correct in his evaluation of the legislation on that point.
52. 118 Cong. Rec. 10,654 (1972) (amendment offered by Mr. Wolf).
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ultimately reversed." The circuit court noted the proposition for which
Northern States stands, but added:
Assuming the correctness of this proposition, such does not mean
that Congress is thereafter foreclosed from later deciding, as we
believe it did, to vest the Environmental Protection Agency with the
duty of regulating the discharge of all radioactive materials into
navigable waters. 4
The validity of the Northern States doctrine rests upon the statutory language
of the Atomic Energy Act, which raises the inference that the states are pre-
empted from regulating atomic waste disposal. According to Colorado Public
Interest Group, this statutory foundation no longer exists, and the operative
law is now to be deduced from the provisions of the 1972 amendments.
When the Colorado Public Interest Group decision is considered in
conjunction with section 1370 of the Water Pollution Control Act," a
rationale is created to justify the imposition of state regulations on the
discharge of radioactive water pollutants. For section 1370 only prohibits a
state from adopting performance standards less stringent than the comparable
EPA standards. The authority of a state to adopt stricter regulations stems
not only from the language of the provision, but from the legislative intent
behind section 137056 as well; and such has been the judicial interpretation."
The 1972 amendments are not pre-emptive in nature, and in those areas
where federal pre-emption was desired, Congress explicitly manifested its
intent.5 Thus, it can be argued that if radioactive pollution is to be regulated
by the EPA under standards established pursuant to the Water Pollution
Control Act, then the states may enact and enforce stricter regulations under
section 1370 of the same governing act.
While a line of reasoning favoring state regulation flows from the express
language of the 1972 amendments, the legislative history raises doubts as to
whether this reasoning will meet with success. To enact regulations to control
nuclear water pollution, the states must rely not only upon Colorado Public
Interest Group being accepted by other courts, but also upon the rationale
that its holding, when combined with section 1370 of the 1972 amendments,
eliminates all vestiges of the Northern States doctrine.
Though it has previously been submitted that Colorado Public Interest
Group properly interpreted the 1972 amendments,5 9 this conclusion merits
further discussion at this point. The legislative history creates a basic
53. 373 F. Supp. at 994-95.
54. 507 F.2d at 749.
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Supp. 1973). See text of statute supra note 29.
56. See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conferences, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1972), 1972 U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWs 3825.
57. People of State of Ill. ex rel. Scott v. City of Milwaukee, Wis., 366 F. Supp. 298, 301
(N.D. Ill. 1973).
58. See 33 U.S.C. § 1322 (f) (1) (Supp. 1973).
59. See text following note 45 supra.
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ambiguity which it fails to resolve. If the mood of Congress was to avoid
interference with the authority of the AEC, why was this not expressly stated?
Section 1362 (6) defines pollutant to include "sewage ", but subpart (a)
expressly states that "sewage from vessels within section 1322 of this title" is
not included. 60 Similarly, material injected into wells in order to facilitate gas
or oil production is excluded from the scope of the definition, and thus from
the coverage of the act.
When a legislature has created exceptions to a statute's coverage, the
presumption arises that it intended to go only as far as it did. This principle
has been referred to as a cardinal rule of statutory construction. 61 Given the
terms of section 1362 (6) and the foregoing rule, it is difficult to conceive
how the Tenth Circuit could have accepted the contentions of the EPA
without exceeding the bounds of judicial discretion. Though Congress may
have, in fact, intended to limit the scope of the term "radioactive materials," it
neither expressed nor implied this intent within the statute. Whether this was
the result of legislative stratagem or mere oversight, it would have been
beyond the province of the Colorado Public Interest Group court to write a
major exception into an unambiguous provision. To borrow from an expres-
sion of the late Justice Frankfurter, Congress did not enact a speech, they
enacted a statute. 62 And the judicial function should be limited to the
interpretation of the latter.
The recognition of Colorado Public Interest Group as the definitive
statement on the meaning of section 1362 (6) is not alone sufficient to carry
the day for state regulation. The legislative history of the 1972 amendments,
and the contention that atomic energy inherently requires federal regulation,
may both be raised against attempted state control. It is not inconceivable that
a decision could be rendered which accepted the narrow holding of Colorado
Public Interest Group, that jurisdiction has been shifted from the AEC to the
EPA, while rejecting that state regulation was therefore permissible.
The district court in Colorado Public Interest Group was apparently of
the opinion that if the EPA interpretation of section 1362 (6) was rejected
both the AEC and the EPA would be required to regulate radioactive
wastes. 63 The appellate opinion, however, does not suggest that dual regula-
tion by the AEC and the EPA is required by its holding. On the contrary, the
circuit court construed the 1972 amendments so as to supersede the Atomic
Energy Act, thus eliminating all AEC authority over radioactive water
pollutants.
This aspect of the decision is illustrated by the manner in which the
defendant's argument that section 137164 of the 1972 amendments prohibits
60. See text of statute supra note 29.
61. See e.g., Knapczyk v. Ribicoff, 201 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
62. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46,64 (1947), (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
63. 373 F. Supp. at 994.
64. 33 U.S.C. § 1371 (Supp. 1973).
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EPA jurisdiction was rejected. In essence, section 1371 states that the 1972
amendments do not limit the functions of any agency, acting under any other
law, not inconsistent with the Water Pollution Control Act. The short reply
given to defendant's reliance upon this section was "that the 1972 Amend-
ments are inconsistent, in the particulars indicated, with the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954."65 And in conclusion, the court stated; "In sum, then, the 1972
Amendments charge the EPA Administrator with the duty of regulating the
discharge of all radioactive materials into the Nation's waters .... ,, 16
The thrust of Colorado Public Interest Group is clearly away from any
notion of dual AEC-EPA regulation. The intent of Congress is there
construed to be that radioactive water pollution, like other forms of water
pollution, is to be regulated by the EPA. If Colorado Public Interest Group is
followed, the possiblity of overlapping regulation at the federal level does not
arise. The most plausible approach would thus be that regulation is to be
carried out within the framework of the Water Pollution Control Act, the
vehicle which was devised to control water pollution, and the vehicle which, as
previously noted, allows for the enforcement of more stringent local stan-
dards.
The position of the Northern States' court, that atomic energy production
inherently requires federal regulation, is also rendered immaterial by the
logical consequences of the Colorado Public Interest Group holding. Whether
or not a particular subject is by nature fit for only uniform, national regulation
is a question for the legislative branch. Issues of pre-emption are, in essence,
searches for manifestations of the intent of Congress, and the judgment of that
body as to the need for regulation, and its scope, is conclusive. 67 It would
thus follow that when Congress expressed the intent to place the control of all
radioactive pollution under the EPA, to be regulated within the legislative
framework established for that agency, it also concluded that the need for
solely federal regulation of radioactive water pollution no longer exists.
When the provisions of the 1972 amendments are given their clear and
literal meaning, as was done in Colorado Public Interest Group, the states are
granted the authority to enforce radioactive water pollution controls which set
higher standards than required by the federal government. Yet, the fact
remains that Congress, while enacting the legislation on which the states must
rely, voted down a proposal embodying the same result which the express
terms of the legislation appear to mandate.
Thus, while the states now have a legal basis on which to initiate
regulation of radioactive pollutants, it cannot be safely predicted that these
regulations will be allowed to stand. A court might choose to disagree with
Colorado Public Interest Group, and reject the literal terms of the statutes in
65. 507 F.2d at 748.
66. Id. at 749.
67. See, e.g., Florida Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
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reliance upon intent perceived from the legislative history. Another might
choose to accept the narrow holding of the decision, but reject the thesis that
it authorizes state participation. And beyond the judicial reception with which
state regulations might be greeted, the possibility also exists that Congress
could invoke its power to pre-empt the field in clear and unmistakable terms.
CONCLUSION
At the outset it was noted that until recently the state of the law
concerning atomic energy pollution was settled and certain. The only valid
conclusion that can now be stated is that the certainty has been dispelled. As
a result of the 1972 amendments to the federal Water Pollution Control Act,
and the decision in Colorado Public Interest Group, a door has been opened
through which the states may attempt to enter the field of regulation of atomic
energy water pollution. The opening is, however, only a crack, capable of
being closed by the courts or the Congress. Nonetheless, the opportunity for
the states is present.
It is possible that the time has now come to re-evaluate the desirability of
federal pre-emption of state control over nuclear power plants from a
pragmatic, as well as a legal, viewpoint." It might be found that the fears
which led the Northern States court to determine that the inherent nature of
atomic energy production precludes state regulation have failed to materialize
and that it is time for new directions." In any event, as a result of the recent
developments discussed, the question is likely to arise as to whether the states
are to have a role in this area of pollution control. The present state of
uncertainty indicates that inconsistent legal responses to the question may be
forthcoming, and suggests that a congressional resolution of the issue is
desirable.
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